Truth as One and Many
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They are abstract objects. Analogous distinctions can be made for letters, for words, for numerals, for musical notes on a stave, indeed for any symbols whatsoever. One reason to favor tokens over types is to solve the problems involving so-called "indexical" or "token reflexive" terms such as "I" and "here" and "now". Is the claim expressed by the sentence-type "I like chocolate" true or false? Well, it depends on who "I" is referring to. If Jack, who likes chocolate, says "I like chocolate", then what he has said is true; but if Jill, who dislikes chocolate, says "I like chocolate", then what she has said is false.
If it were sentence-types which were the bearers of truth-values, then the sentence-type "I like chocolate" would be both true and false — an unacceptable contradiction. The contradiction is avoided, however, if one argues that sentence-tokens are the bearers of truth-values, for in this case although there is only one sentence-type involved, there are two distinct sentence-tokens.
A second reason for arguing that sentence-tokens, rather than sentence-types, are the bearers of truth-values has been advanced by nominalist philosophers. Nominalists are intent to allow as few abstract objects as possible. Insofar as sentence-types are abstract objects and sentence-tokens are concrete objects, nominalists will argue that actually uttered or written sentence-tokens are the proper bearers of truth-values. But the theory that sentence-tokens are the bearers of truth-values has its own problems.
One objection to the nominalist theory is that had there never been any language-users, then there would be no truths. And the same objection can be leveled against arguing that it is beliefs that are the bearers of truth-values: had there never been any conscious creatures then there would be no beliefs and, thus, no truths or falsehoods, not even the truth that there were no conscious creatures — an unacceptably paradoxical implication.
And a second objection — to the theory that sentence-tokens are the bearers of truth-values — is that even though there are language-users, there are sentences that have never been uttered and never will be. Consider, for example, the distinct number of different ways that a deck of playing cards can be arranged. And there are countless other examples as well. Sentence-tokens, then, cannot be identified as the bearers of truth-values — there simply are too few sentence-tokens.
Thus both theories — i that sentence-tokens are the bearers of truth-values, and ii that sentence-types are the bearers of truth-values — encounter difficulties. Might propositions be the bearers of truth-values? To escape the dilemma of choosing between tokens and types, propositions have been suggested as the primary bearers of truth-values. The following five sentences are in different languages, but they all are typically used to express the same proposition or statement.
The truth of the proposition that Saturn is the sixth planet from the Sun depends only on the physics of the solar system, and not in any obvious way on human convention. By contrast, what these five sentences say does depend partly on human convention. Had English speakers chosen to adopt the word "Saturn" as the name of a different particular planet, the first sentence would have expressed something false.
By choosing propositions rather than sentences as the bearers of truth-values, this relativity to human conventions does not apply to truth, a point that many philosophers would consider to be a virtue in a theory of truth. Propositions are abstract entities; they do not exist in space and time. They are sometimes said to be "timeless", "eternal", or "omnitemporal" entities. Terminology aside, the essential point is that propositions are not concrete or material objects. Nor, for that matter, are they mental entities; they are not "thoughts" as Frege had suggested in the nineteenth century.
The theory that propositions are the bearers of truth-values also has been criticized. Nominalists object to the abstract character of propositions. Another complaint is that it's not sufficiently clear when we have a case of the same propositions as opposed to similar propositions. This is much like the complaint that we can't determine when two sentences have exactly the same meaning. The relationship between sentences and propositions is a serious philosophical problem.
Because it is the more favored theory, and for the sake of expediency and consistency, the theory that propositions — and not sentences — are the bearers of truth-values will be adopted in this article. When we speak below of "truths", we are referring to true propositions.
But it should be pointed out that virtually all the claims made below have counterparts in nominalistic theories which reject propositions. These constraints require that every proposition has exactly one truth-value. Although the point is controversial, most philosophers add the further constraint that a proposition never changes its truth-value in space or time. Consequently, to say "The proposition that it's raining was true yesterday but false today" is to equivocate and not actually refer to just one proposition.
Similarly, when someone at noon on January 15, in Vancouver says that the proposition that it is raining is true in Vancouver while false in Sacramento, that person is really talking of two different propositions: i that it rains in Vancouver at noon on January 15, and ii that it rains in Sacramento at noon on January 15, The person is saying proposition i is true and ii is false.
Not all sentences express propositions. The interrogative sentence "Who won the World Series in ? But do all declarative sentences express propositions? The following four kinds of declarative sentences have been suggested as not being typically used to express propositions, but all these suggestions are controversial. In light of the fact that France has no king, Strawson argued that the sentence, "The present king of France is bald", fails to express a proposition.
In a famous dispute, Russell disagreed with Strawson, arguing that the sentence does express a proposition, and more exactly, a false one. What about declarative sentences that refer to events in the future? For example, does the sentence "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" express a proposition? Presumably, today we do not know whether there will be such a battle. Because of this, some philosophers including Aristotle who toyed with the idea have argued that the sentence, at the present moment, does not express anything that is now either true or false. Another, perhaps more powerful, motivation for adopting this view is the belief that if sentences involving future human actions were to express propositions, i.
To defend free will, these philosophers have argued, we must deny truth-values to predictions. This complicating restriction — that sentences about the future do not now express anything true or false — has been attacked by Quine and others. These critics argue that the restriction upsets the logic we use to reason with such predictions.
For example, here is a deductively valid argument involving predictions:. We've learned there will be a run on the bank tomorrow. If there will be a run on the bank tomorrow, then the CEO should be awakened. Without assertions in this argument having truth-values, regardless of whether we know those values, we could not assess the argument using the canons of deductive validity and invalidity.
We would have to say — contrary to deeply-rooted philosophical intuitions — that it is not really an argument at all. For another sort of rebuttal to the claim that propositions about the future cannot be true prior to the occurrence of the events described, see Logical Determinism. A liar sentence can be used to generate a paradox when we consider what truth-value to assign it.
As a way out of paradox, Kripke suggests that a liar sentence is one of those rare declarative sentences that does not express a proposition. The sentence falls into the truth-value gap. See the article Liar Paradox. Do sentences such as "Torturing children is wrong" — which assert moral principles — assert something true or false , or do they merely express in a disguised fashion the speaker's opinions, or feelings or values?
Making the latter choice, some philosophers argue that these declarative sentences do not express propositions. We return to the principal question, "What is truth? It is the goal of scientific inquiry, historical research, and business audits. We understand much of what a sentence means by understanding the conditions under which what it expresses is true. Yet the exact nature of truth itself is not wholly revealed by these remarks. Historically, the most popular theory of truth was the Correspondence Theory.
First proposed in a vague form by Plato and by Aristotle in his Metaphysics , this realist theory says truth is what propositions have by corresponding to a way the world is. The theory says that a proposition is true provided there exists a fact corresponding to it. In other words, for any proposition p,. The theory's answer to the question, "What is truth? Perhaps an analysis of the relationship will reveal what all the truths have in common.
Consider the proposition that snow is white. Remarking that the proposition's truth is its corresponding to the fact that snow is white leads critics to request an acceptable analysis of this notion of correspondence. Surely the correspondence is not a word by word connecting of a sentence to its reference.
It is some sort of exotic relationship between, say, whole propositions and facts.
Rabindranath Tagore - Facts are many, but the truth is one.
In presenting his theory of logical atomism early in the twentieth century, Russell tried to show how a true proposition and its corresponding fact share the same structure. Inspired by the notion that Egyptian hieroglyphs are stylized pictures, his student Wittgenstein said the relationship is that of a "picturing" of facts by propositions, but his development of this suggestive remark in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus did not satisfy many other philosophers, nor after awhile, even Wittgenstein himself.
And what are facts? The notion of a fact as some sort of ontological entity was first stated explicitly in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Correspondence Theory does permit facts to be mind-dependent entities. McTaggart, and perhaps Kant, held such Correspondence Theories. The Correspondence theories of Russell , Wittgenstein and Austin all consider facts to be mind-independent.
But regardless of their mind-dependence or mind-independence, the theory must provide answers to questions of the following sort. A true proposition can't be a fact if it also states a fact, so what is the ontological standing of a fact?
Is the fact that corresponds to "Brutus stabbed Caesar" the same fact that corresponds to "Caesar was stabbed by Brutus", or is it a different fact? It might be argued that they must be different facts because one expresses the relationship of stabbing but the other expresses the relationship of being stabbed, which is different. In addition to the specific fact that ball 1 is on the pool table and the specific fact that ball 2 is on the pool table, and so forth, is there the specific fact that there are fewer than 1,, balls on the table? Is there the general fact that many balls are on the table?
Does the existence of general facts require there to be the Forms of Plato or Aristotle? What about the negative proposition that there are no pink elephants on the table? Does it correspond to the same situation in the world that makes there be no green elephants on the table? The same pool table must involve a great many different facts. These questions illustrate the difficulty in counting facts and distinguishing them. The difficulty is well recognized by advocates of the Correspondence Theory, but critics complain that characterizations of facts too often circle back ultimately to saying facts are whatever true propositions must correspond to in order to be true.
Davidson has criticized the notion of fact, arguing that "if true statements correspond to anything, they all correspond to the same thing" in "True to the Facts", Davidson . Davidson also has argued that facts really are the true statements themselves; facts are not named by them, as the Correspondence Theory mistakenly supposes. Defenders of the Correspondence Theory have responded to these criticisms in a variety of ways. Sense can be made of the term "correspondence", some say, because speaking of propositions corresponding to facts is merely making the general claim that summarizes the remark that.
Therefore, the Correspondence theory must contain a theory of "means that" but otherwise is not at fault. Other defenders of the Correspondence Theory attack Davidson's identification of facts with true propositions. Snow is a constituent of the fact that snow is white, but snow is not a constituent of a linguistic entity, so facts and true statements are different kinds of entities.
Recent work in possible world semantics has identified facts with sets of possible worlds. The fact that the cat is on the mat contains the possible world in which the cat is on the mat and Adolf Hitler converted to Judaism while Chancellor of Germany. The motive for this identification is that, if sets of possible worlds are metaphysically legitimate and precisely describable, then so are facts. To more rigorously describe what is involved in understanding truth and defining it, Alfred Tarski created his Semantic Theory of Truth. In Tarski's theory, however, talk of correspondence and of facts is eliminated.
Although in early versions of his theory, Tarski did use the term "correspondence" in trying to explain his theory, he later regretted having done so, and dropped the term altogether since it plays no role within his theory. The Semantic Theory is the successor to the Correspondence Theory. For an illustration of the theory, consider the German sentence "Schnee ist weiss" which means that snow is white. Tarski asks for the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed by that sentence: "Under what conditions is that proposition true?
Line 1 is about truth. Line 3 is not about truth — it asserts a claim about the nature of the world. Thus T makes a substantive claim. Moreover, it avoids the main problems of the earlier Correspondence Theories in that the terms "fact" and "correspondence" play no role whatever. A theory is a Tarskian truth theory for language L if and only if, for each sentence S of L , if S expresses the proposition that p, then the theory entails a true "T-proposition" of the bi-conditional form:.
In the example we have been using, namely, "Schnee ist weiss", it is quite clear that the T-proposition consists of a containing or "outer" sentence in English, and a contained or "inner" or quoted sentence in German:. There are, we see, sentences in two distinct languages involved in this T-proposition. If, however, we switch the inner, or quoted sentence, to an English sentence, e.
In this latter case, it looks as if only one language English , not two, is involved in expressing the T-proposition. But, according to Tarski's theory, there are still two languages involved: i the language one of whose sentences is being quoted and ii the language which attributes truth to the proposition expressed by that quoted sentence. The quoted sentence is said to be an element of the object language , and the outer or containing sentence which uses the predicate "true" is in the metalanguage.
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Tarski discovered that in order to avoid contradiction in his semantic theory of truth, he had to restrict the object language to a limited portion of the metalanguage. Among other restrictions, it is the metalanguage alone that contains the truth-predicates, "true" and "false"; the object language does not contain truth-predicates. This latter claim is certainly true it is a tautology , but it is no significant part of the analysis of the concept of truth — indeed it does not even use the words "true" or "truth", nor does it involve an object language and a metalanguage.
Tarski's T-condition does both. Tarski's complete theory is intended to work for just about all propositions, expressed by non-problematic declarative sentences, not just "Snow is white. Also, Tarski wants his truth theory to reveal the logical structure within propositions that permits valid reasoning to preserve truth. To do all this, the theory must work for more complex propositions by showing how the truth-values of these complex propositions depend on their parts, such as the truth-values of their constituent propositions.
Truth tables show how this is done for the simple language of Propositional Logic e. Tarski's goal is to define truth for even more complex languages. Tarski's theory does not explain analyze when a name denotes an object or when an object falls under a predicate; his theory begins with these as given. He wants what we today call a model theory for quantified predicate logic. His actual theory is very technical. The idea of using satisfaction treats the truth of a simple proposition such as expressed by "Socrates is mortal" by saying:.
If "Socrates" is a name and "is mortal" is a predicate, then "Socrates is mortal" expresses a true proposition if and only if there exists an object x such that "Socrates" refers to x and "is mortal" is satisfied by x. If "a" is a name and "Q" is a predicate, then "a is Q" expresses a true proposition if and only if there exists an object x such that "a" refers to x and "Q" is satisfied by x. The idea is to define the predicate "is true" when it is applied to the simplest that is, the non-complex or atomic sentences in the object language a language, see above, which does not, itself, contain the truth-predicate "is true".
The predicate "is true" is a predicate that occurs only in the metalanguage, i. At the second stage, his theory shows how the truth predicate, when it has been defined for propositions expressed by sentences of a certain degree of grammatical complexity, can be defined for propositions of the next greater degree of complexity. According to Tarski, his theory applies only to artificial languages — in particular, the classical formal languages of symbolic logic — because our natural languages are vague and unsystematic.
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Other philosophers — for example, Donald Davidson — have not been as pessimistic as Tarski about analyzing truth for natural languages. Davidson has made progress in extending Tarski's work to any natural language. Doing so, he says, provides at the same time the central ingredient of a theory of meaning for the language. Davidson develops the original idea Frege stated in his Basic Laws of Arithmetic that the meaning of a declarative sentence is given by certain conditions under which it is true—that meaning is given by truth conditions.
As part of the larger program of research begun by Tarski and Davidson, many logicians, linguists, philosophers, and cognitive scientists, often collaboratively, pursue research programs trying to elucidate the truth-conditions that is, the "logics" or semantics for the propositions expressed by such complex sentences as:. Each of these research areas contains its own intriguing problems. All must overcome the difficulties involved with ambiguity, tenses, and indexical phrases. Many philosophers divide the class of propositions into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive subclasses: namely, propositions that are contingent that is, those that are neither necessarily-true nor necessarily-false and those that are noncontingent that is, those that are necessarily-true or necessarily-false.
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On the Semantic Theory of Truth, contingent propositions are those that are true or false because of some specific way the world happens to be. For example all of the following propositions are contingent :. The contrasting class of propositions comprises those whose truth or falsehood, as the case may be is dependent, according to the Semantic Theory, not on some specific way the world happens to be, but on any way the world happens to be.
Imagine the world changed however you like provided, of course, that its description remains logically consistent [i. Even under those conditions, the truth-values of the following noncontingent propositions will remain unchanged:. However, some philosophers who accept the Semantic Theory of Truth for contingent propositions, reject it for noncontingent ones. They have argued that the truth of noncontingent propositions has a different basis from the truth of contingent ones. The truth of noncontingent propositions comes about, they say — not through their correctly describing the way the world is — but as a matter of the definitions of terms occurring in the sentences expressing those propositions.
Noncontingent truths, on this account, are said to be true by definition , or — as it is sometimes said, in a variation of this theme — as a matter of conceptual relationships between the concepts at play within the propositions, or — yet another kindred way — as a matter of the meanings of the sentences expressing the propositions. It is apparent, in this competing account, that one is invoking a kind of theory of linguistic truth.
In this alternative theory, truth for a certain class of propositions, namely the class of noncontingent propositions, is to be accounted for — not in their describing the way the world is, but rather — because of certain features of our human linguistic constructs. Does the Semantic Theory need to be supplemented in this manner? If one were to adopt the Semantic Theory of Truth, would one also need to adopt a complementary theory of truth, namely, a theory of linguistic truth for noncontingent propositions? Or, can the Semantic Theory of Truth be used to explain the truth-values of all propositions, the contingent and noncontingent alike?
If so, how? To see how one can argue that the Semantic Theory of Truth can be used to explicate the truth of noncontingent propositions, consider the following series of propositions, the first four of which are contingent, the fifth of which is noncontingent:. Each of these propositions, as we move from the second to the fifth, is slightly less specific than its predecessor.
Each can be regarded as being true under a greater range of variation or circumstances than its predecessor. When we reach the fifth member of the series we have a proposition that is true under any and all sets of circumstances. Some philosophers — a few in the seventeenth century, a very great many more after the mid-twentieth century — use the idiom of "possible worlds", saying that noncontingent truths are true in all possible worlds [i.
On this view, what distinguishes noncontingent truths from contingent ones is not that their truth arises as a consequence of facts about our language or of meanings, etc. Contingent propositions are true in some, but not all, possible circumstances or possible worlds. Noncontingent propositions, in contrast, are true in all possible circumstances or in none. There is no difference as to the nature of truth for the two classes of propositions, only in the ranges of possibilities in which the propositions are true. An adherent of the Semantic Theory will allow that there is, to be sure, a powerful insight in the theories of linguistic truth.
But, they will counter, these linguistic theories are really shedding no light on the nature of truth itself. Rather, they are calling attention to how we often go about ascertaining the truth of noncontingent propositions.
Pluralist Theories of Truth
While it is certainly possible to ascertain the truth experientially and inductively of the noncontingent proposition that all aunts are females — for example, one could knock on a great many doors asking if any of the residents were aunts and if so, whether they were female — it would be a needless exercise. We need not examine the world carefully to figure out the truth-value of the proposition that all aunts are females.
We might, for example, simply consult an English dictionary. How we ascertain , find out , determine the truth-values of noncontingent propositions may but need not invariably be by nonexperiential means; but from that it does not follow that the nature of truth of noncontingent propositions is fundamentally different from that of contingent ones. On this latter view, the Semantic Theory of Truth is adequate for both contingent propositions and noncontingent ones. In neither case is the Semantic Theory of Truth intended to be a theory of how we might go about finding out what the truth-value is of any specified proposition.
Indeed, one very important consequence of the Semantic Theory of Truth is that it allows for the existence of propositions whose truth-values are in principle unknowable to human beings. And there is a second motivation for promoting the Semantic Theory of Truth for noncontingent propositions.
How is it that mathematics is able to be used in concert with physical theories to explain the nature of the world? On the Semantic Theory, the answer is that the noncontingent truths of mathematics correctly describe the world as they would any and every possible world. The Linguistic Theory, which makes the truth of the noncontingent truths of mathematics arise out of features of language, is usually thought to have great, if not insurmountable, difficulties in grappling with this question. The Correspondence Theory and the Semantic Theory account for the truth of a proposition as arising out of a relationship between that proposition and features or events in the world.
Coherence Theories of which there are a number , in contrast, account for the truth of a proposition as arising out of a relationship between that proposition and other propositions. Coherence Theories are valuable because they help to reveal how we arrive at our truth claims, our knowledge. We continually work at fitting our beliefs together into a coherent system. For example, when a drunk driver says, "There are pink elephants dancing on the highway in front of us", we assess whether his assertion is true by considering what other beliefs we have already accepted as true, namely,.
In short, the drunk's claim fails to cohere with a great many other claims that we believe and have good reason not to abandon. We, then, reject the drunk's claim as being false and take away the car keys. For example, one Coherence Theory fills this blank with "the beliefs of the majority of persons in one's society". Another fills the blank with "one's own beliefs", and yet another fills it with "the beliefs of the intellectuals in one's society".
The major coherence theories view coherence as requiring at least logical consistency. Rationalist metaphysicians would claim that a proposition is true if and only if it "is consistent with all other true propositions". Some rationalist metaphysicians go a step beyond logical consistency and claim that a proposition is true if and only if it "entails or logically implies all other true propositions". Coherence Theories have their critics too. The proposition that bismuth has a higher melting point than tin may cohere with my beliefs but not with your beliefs.
This, then, leads to the proposition being both "true for me" but "false for you". But if "true for me" means "true" and "false for you" means "false" as the Coherence Theory implies, then we have a violation of the law of non-contradiction, which plays havoc with logic. Most philosophers prefer to preserve the law of non-contradiction over any theory of truth that requires rejecting it. Consequently, if someone is making a sensible remark by saying, "That is true for me but not for you," then the person must mean simply, "I believe it, but you do not.
A second difficulty with Coherence Theories is that the beliefs of any one person or of any group are invariably self-contradictory. A person might, for example, believe both "Absence makes the heart grow fonder" and "Out of sight, out of mind.
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Thus most propositions, by failing to cohere, will not have truth-values. This result violates the law of the excluded middle. And there is a third objection. What does "coheres with" mean? For X to "cohere with" Y, at the very least X must be consistent with Y. All right, then, what does "consistent with" mean?
It would be circular to say that "X is consistent with Y" means "it is possible for X and Y both to be true together" because this response is presupposing the very concept of truth that it is supposed to be analyzing. Some defenders of the Coherence Theory will respond that "coheres with" means instead "is harmonious with". Opponents, however, are pessimistic about the prospects for explicating the concept "is harmonious with" without at some point or other having to invoke the concept of joint truth.
A fourth objection is that Coherence theories focus on the nature of verifiability and not truth. They focus on the holistic character of verifying that a proposition is true but don't answer the principal problem, "What is truth itself? In recent years, one particular Coherence Theory has attracted a lot of attention and some considerable heat and fury. Postmodernist philosophers ask us to carefully consider how the statements of the most persuasive or politically influential people become accepted as the "common truths".
Although everyone would agree that influential people — the movers and shakers — have profound effects upon the beliefs of other persons, the controversy revolves around whether the acceptance by others of their beliefs is wholly a matter of their personal or institutional prominence. The most radical postmodernists do not distinguish acceptance as true from being true ; they claim that the social negotiations among influential people "construct" the truth.
The truth, they argue, is not something lying outside of human collective decisions; it is not, in particular, a "reflection" of an objective reality. Or, to put it another way, to the extent that there is an objective reality it is nothing more nor less than what we say it is. We human beings are, then, the ultimate arbiters of what is true. Consensus is truth. The "subjective" and the "objective" are rolled into one inseparable compound. These postmodernist views have received a more sympathetic reception among social scientists than among physical scientists. Social scientists will more easily agree, for example, that the proposition that human beings have a superego is a "construction" of certain politically influential psychologists, and that as a result, it is to be regarded as true.
In contrast, physical scientists are — for the most part — rather unwilling to regard propositions in their own field as somehow merely the product of consensus among eminent physical scientists. They are inclined to believe that the proposition that protons are composed of three quarks is true or false depending on whether or not it accurately describes an objective reality. They are disinclined to believe that the truth of such a proposition arises out of the pronouncements of eminent physical scientists.
In short, physical scientists do not believe that prestige and social influence trump reality. A Pragmatic Theory of Truth holds roughly that a proposition is true if it is useful to believe. Peirce and James were its principal advocates. Utility is the essential mark of truth. Beliefs that lead to the best "payoff", that are the best justification of our actions, that promote success, are truths, according to the pragmatists.
I might even create a model, an analogy of the workings of the real world, to explain it - in this case that of particles and fields. This then allows me to predict what future events might occur or to draw implications and create technologies, such as developing an electric motor. And so I inductively scaffold my knowledge, using information I rely upon as a resource for further enquiry. At no stage do I arrive at deductive certainty, but I do enjoy greater degrees of confidence.
Now, there are some philosophical hairs to split here, but my point is not to define exactly what truth is, but rather to say there are differences in how the word can be used, and that ignoring or conflating these uses leads to a misunderstanding of what science is and how it works. For instance, the lady that said to me it was true for her that ghosts exist was conflating a subjective truth with a truth about the external world. At first she was resistant, but when I asked her if it could be true for her that gravity is repulsive, she was obliging enough to accept my suggestion.
Attacking the truth claim is then, if you accept this deceit, equivalent to questioning the genuine subject experience. It has been a long and painful struggle for science to rise from this cognitive quagmire, separating out subjective experience from inductive methodology. Any attempt to reunite them in the public understanding of science needs immediate attention. Subjective truths and scientific truths are different creatures, and while they sometimes play nicely together, their offspring are not always fertile.
A contemporary Robinsonade — York, York. The polar oceans and global climate — Milton Keynes, Buckinghamshire. Edition: Available editions United Kingdom. Peter Ellerton , The University of Queensland. You want the truth? Venture Vancouver While philosophers talk about the coherence or correspondence theories of truth, the rest of us have to deal with another, more immediate, division: subjective, deductive logical and inductive in this case, scientific truth.
Subjective truth Subjective truth is what is true about your experience of the world. Deductive truth Deductive truth, on the other hand, is that contained within and defined by deductive logic. PistoCasero If you want to argue the case, you have to step out of the logical framework in which deductive logic operates, and this invalidates rational discussion. Inductive truth Induction works mostly through analogy and generalisation. Checkmate … unless you see how the rules have been changed.
Science communication Philosophy Scientific method Truth. You might also like Humans have always sought knowledge, all the way back to Eve. Political fissures extend to the TV screen. Street cobbler. Sam 'Dele-Ogunti Documentary Photographer.