Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran (Rand Corporation Monograph)

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But it is a leap to presume that these precedents mean that nuclear weapons will remain safe, especially in unstable countries like Pakistan and North Korea. Any unhardened vehicle will be radiation killed at these ranges. However, he goes on to note that in order to boost electrons to the velocities required for an X-ray free electron laser, you will need an acceleration ring approximately one freaking kilometer in diameter 50 Days of War and Peace or Why Harry Dropped the Atomic Bomb 2 Volume Set Paperback princecoffeehouse.

It also argued that nuclear wars could be won. The Doctrine gave increased authority to field commanders to propose targets for nuclear attacks and described the circumstances when field commanders could request approval to launch first-strike nuclear attacks.

Quoted in Weissman, Steve and Krosney, Herbert. The Movement welcomes that, five years later, such negotiations may become a reality through an inclusive process in the framework of the UN General Assembly. Although the prohibition of nuclear weapons is only one of the measures needed to ensure they are never again used and are eliminated, it is an indispensable building block in reaching the universal goal of a world free of nuclear weapons ref.

Students at Groton even coined a name for it, muscular Christianity. President Reagan puzzled over the possibility of Armageddon, uncertain whether or not God was commanding him to destroy earth or to leave it in the hands of God ref. What fraction of the 11,Mt would be exploded in a major nuclear war? This is hard to assess, but almost certainly much will not be exploded.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union place a high priority on targeting their opponent's military forces, nuclear forces in particular. A sizable fraction of nuclear arsenals is likely to be destroyed before use attacks on nuclear submarines, airfields, missile silos , be unavailable for use submarines in port, missiles cut off from communications or fail to perform properly.

The problem, as Americans are fast learning, is that there really are not that many controls. China reacted by sending nuclear technology to Pakistan. Robert Oppenheimer: A Life download pdf institutocrescer. This is a complex process because it requires the separation of isotopes of the same element which means they have the same chemical behavior and the isotopes have almost the same weight. Thus multiple stages of gas diffusion, centrifuges or electromagnetic calutron separation are required.

This is inevitably a major industrial project, and is likely to be detectable by intelligence agencies Technology and the download here institutocrescer. With a Kt weapon such heat could readily extend from 1. For the most part, in those mission areas in which it naturally excelled, the IAF performed to its usual high standards of competence throughout the day engagement against Hezbollah. Indeed, the final report of the Winograd Commission, which had been established by Prime Minister Olmert after the campaign ended to investigate.

In some respects, IAF cooperation with the ground forces was said to have been exemplary, particularly with respect to the integration of utility helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs.

Iran - Sep 2015 A angry Iranian citizen shout out his anger about the brutal Mullah regime

More problematic, in contrast, was the uneven involvement of IAF fighters and attack helicopters in air-land operations owing to the absence of prior joint practice during peacetime large-force training exercises. Roughly 12, of those were fighter sorties in all mission categories, with attack helicopters racking up another 2, sorties. In addition, more than 1, surveillance sorties and around 1, air mobility sorties were flown during the day campaign.

IAF rotarywing aircrews conducted roughly combat search and rescue missions, nearly half of them inside Hezbollah-infested territory and often under heavy fire. Furthermore, combat medical evacuation sorties were flown, 94 of which entailed emergency rescue operations under fire. Compared with the three weeks of major combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom by American and allied forces in March and April , Operation Change of Direction lasted longer 34 days against 21 , saw a release of almost as many air-delivered munitions 24, compared.

This is particularly evident in light of the considerably more integrated and effective IDF response in December and January to a similar set of provocations that emanated from the terrorist organization Hamas, which controlled the Gaza Strip in southern Israel. In undertaking its response with such sustained ferociousness, Israel further showed its determination to answer any future challenges from both Hezbollah and Hamas with disproportionate levels of firepower that would have a persuasive deterring effect.

Israel also gained a greatly improved security situation in southern Lebanon as a result of the campaign, and the formerly volatile border region is now more quiescent than it has been in a generation. This suggests. However, this came at a substantial cost to Israel. Yet its response was not fully explored in all its risks and ramifications before it committed itself to action. As a result, the IDF initiated its counteroffensive without having given adequate.

Not only were those declared goals progressively ramped downward as the campaign unfolded, they also created initial public expectations that had no prospect of being fulfilled. Rather, what he sought to employ to useful coercive effect was precision standoff firepower. Nevertheless, there remained a widely felt compulsion to continue deferring the fateful transition to a major ground incursion for as long as possible. To repeat, no one who mattered was calling for an early ground offensive. On the contrary, that belief was never held either by Halutz or by any of his civilian superiors at any time from the start of the crisis.

Whatever credibility and merit this book may have is attributable in substantial part to the help of many individuals in the United States, United Kingdom UK , and Israel. On the U. I also had useful exchanges with several working-level officers with whom I was authorized to discuss the war experience, including Colonel Shai last name withheld , IAF Res.

During a return trip to Israel in March , I met again with General Shkedy, who had generously read my initial draft in its. That experience, along with the opportunity to converse at length with dozens of active and retired IAF officers over the course of eight visits to Israel throughout the past three decades, has been of indispensable value in enabling me to place the research reflected in this book into a more informed context. Since this product is mainly an assessment of Israeli air operations, most of my interviews were naturally conducted with IAF airmen.

General Gantz, Colonel Siboni, and Colonel Meir last name withheld were also kind enough to read and comment on portions of the book dealing with air-ground integration and related matters. I must emphasize, however, that for all the extensive assistance I received from the many serving IAF and IDF officers acknowledged above over the course of preparing this book, the final product is my work alone and in no way reflects their official views or endorsement.

For their support in providing me translations of key articles from the Israeli press, I owe thanks to Brian Fishpaugh, Randy Mayer, and. Michael Wales of the U. Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, for. I also express special thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Roni Amir of the IAF for his indispensable support in accompanying me to all of my meetings with senior IAF and IDF leaders, sharing generously of his time in offering informed insights into the many IAF contributions to the second Lebanon and Gaza wars, providing most of the figures and photographs that are included herein, and carefully vetting several earlier drafts of this book to ensure its greatest possible thoroughness and accuracy, within the obvious constraints that necessarily limited his freedom, as well as that of all other IAF and IDF officers with whom I met, to be forthcoming with certain facts and operational details.

For most of the items included in the two photo galleries that follow, I wish to acknowledge the IAF, the IDF spokesman, and Nir Ben-Yosef, who kindly granted his permission for me to use his copyrighted photos. As always, however, responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation that may remain in the assessment that follows is mine alone. Air Force visual intelligence weapons systems officer. That campaign was an escalated response to a long-planned Hezbollah incursion into northern Israel and the prompt abduction of two IDF soldiers, who were then spirited back into Lebanon as hostages to be used as leverage in a hoped-for trade for Islamist terrorists who had previously been incarcerated by Israeli forces.

It also is devoted unswervingly to the destruction of the State of Israel. In this regard, the confrontation represented the first time that the Israeli homeland had been subjected to continuous enemy bombardment for so long. Those failures, in turn, prompted a groundswell of postwar recriminations throughout Israeli society in search of culprits to blame. Katyusha, discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four, is an inaccurate unguided mm or mm rocket with an explosive front end and a range of between 12 and 20 miles. Hezbollah had an estimated 13, or more of them stockpiled in southern Lebanon when the war began.

After retiring as IAF commander in , he was brought back into active service and appointed to the position of Chief of Staff in For example, one Israeli 5 Group. The Israeli defense community, most notably its uniformed component, has long been hypercautious by inclination when it comes to disclosing even the most basic facts about the capabilities, techniques, and operating practices of its forces—facts that would be regarded by most Western armed forces as in no way particularly sensitive.

Today, with Israeli society more transparent than ever before, the once heavily shrouded IDF has begun to show increasing signs of opening itself up to outside scrutiny, at least at the margins. All the same, both during and after the campaign, the IDF divulged virtually no details about its force-employment activities that would allow outside observers to produce a reconstructed account of the fighting with any significant degree of operational richness or clear appreciation of what mix of force elements was actually in play at various stages of the fighting.

Rather, it was a deliberate resort to precision standoff attacks that also included heavy IDF ground-force fires from the opening moments in a situation in which not just Halutz and his key subordinates in the General Headquarters, but also his civilian superiors in the Olmert government to a man, were not prepared at the outset to commit to a major push into southern Lebanon on the ground owing to the certainty of high Israeli combat casualties that any such move would inevitably produce.

Those errors will be duly spotlighted in the chapters that follow. The principal aim of this book is to develop and document the above proposition by marshaling the broadest range of evidence deriv-. It also is uninformed by any input from senior IAF and IDF officers who actually played a first-hand part in the planning and execution of the campaign. To be recognized as an essential player in conflict, air power does not have to demonstrate that it is able to win wars independently.

The truth is that the more sophisticated advocates of air power and the more balanced theorists for land power are both correct. The relative importance of air and ground must depend on the situation. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, Westport, Conn. There is a constant danger that much more will be asked and expected of it than it can deliver.

After that largely descriptive parsing of Israeli air operations during the campaign, the book then turns to a synopsis of the main findings arrived at by the Winograd Commission that was convened by Prime Minister Olmert in the early aftermath of the campaign to determine what lay at the heart of its disappointing results. Hamas in the Gaza Strip in late December and early January that reflected the many lessons that the IDF learned and assimilated to improve its combat repertoire following its after-action assessment of the many problems encountered during its earlier experience in Lebanon.

His consuming goals entailed becoming the controlling political force within Lebanon and bending every effort to destroy the state of Israel in reprisal for its initial invasion and occupation of the country.

Indeed, through its well-funded Hezbollah proxy in Lebanon, Iran ultimately succeeded in creating a de facto border for itself with Israel that Israel, owing to simple geography, has been unable to reciprocate. By any measure, Hezbol2 Robin. It is anything but just another ragtag group of angry Islamist terrorists imbued with arms and an attitude. It also housed a 5 Dahiye. Figure 2. One particularly notable hostile act was prompted by the killing of the commander of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, MahFigure 2. This is a random point on the Lebanese border chosen to show rocket ranges.

It is not meant to indicate any particular launch area used by Hezbollah. The page numbers indicated hereinafter for citations from this document refer to those in an unpublished English translation from the original Hebrew that was kindly produced for the author by the U. Taken together, those initiatives should have been read by the IDF as clear warning of more of the same to come. At on the morning of July 12, , a well-armed and practiced Hezbollah snatch team crossed the Israeli border at an unmonitored point near the farming village of Shtula and ambushed an unsuspecting IDF patrol during a fleetingly vulnerable moment, killing three soldiers, capturing two more, and promptly taking the latter across the border into Lebanon.

This carefully staged abduction had long been in the works, with Hezbollah merely awaiting a ripe opportunity. Nasrallah declared shortly thereafter that the attack, which caught the IDF completely by surprise, had been planned for months with a view toward forcing negotiations to win the release of numerous Islamist terrorists who were being held captive by Israel. Indeed, at the time the war started, Hezbollah was said to have possessed more of such rockets than the Syrian military establishment itself. The first Israeli air presence to enter the fray in response was a two-ship element of IAF attack helicopters that had been scrambled from an alert posture to investigate the two incidents.

They arrived at at Phase Line along the Israeli-Lebanese border where the abduction had occurred just half an hour before. From midmorning onward, IAF fighters repeatedly struck dozens of assigned. We can shut off their electricity for a year. However, Halutz continued to press hard for taking every possible advantage of the looming first night so that IDF forces could fully recapture the initiative before the wheels of diplomacy took over and foreclosed any opportunity for Israel to deal a potentially fatal blow to Hezbollah. He quickly concluded, rightly, that the return of 11 Nicholas.

If the intent of this targeting of bridges was to prevent any access by Hezbollah to the part of Lebanon closest to the Israeli border south of the Litani River, it most likely failed to achieve its hoped-for objective. Although the dropping of bridges by the IAF definitely impeded major surface movement by large vehicles, Hezbollah still enjoyed reasonable freedom of north-south passage by advancing on foot or by using bicycles, motorcycles, or four-wheel-drive trucks and automobiles.

Many of the undocumented facts and figures in this chapter were originally released in daily IDF reports to the press. Both of them. This was not the first time that Halutz had called for such a response. The nature of the response was rooted in the decisions that had been made in March , when a basket of targets had been approved.

In previous discussions, all the security agencies had recommended a major military operation in the event of another kidnapping attempt. In so failing, it did not extract the fullest use of its intentions in its information operations and allowed Hezbollah free rein in the information war, which the terrorist organization exploited to the limit.

I am grateful to Air Vice-Marshal M. Colley, RAF, for calling this important point to my attention. The third raised the obvious question of how. The fourth goal, finally, was as extravagant as the first. Although achievable in principle, it could only have been attained at a cost far greater than the Olmert government and the Israeli people would most likely have been willing to pay in terms of both IDF casualties incurred and, most likely, a renewed Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon with no end in sight. The first and last of these four lofty promises, both unfulfilled in the end, would come back to haunt the Olmert incumbency once the postwar recriminations and assorted efforts to apportion blame had begun to gather momentum.

Notably, moreover, these were not the more focused mission assignments that were transmitted to the IDF for execution by Halutz. We will not allow this conflict to end with Hezbollah returning to the same position it held before. According to an IDF statement that was later released to the press, the targets struck the first day included three bridges over the Litani River, two bridges 21 Sanu Kainikara and Russell Parkin, Pathways to Victory: Observations from the Israel-. As the first day of IDF strike operations in response to the abduction neared an end, it was becoming increasingly clear that the preferred approach of the Olmert government, at least for the time being, would be to rely exclusively on standoff attacks by IAF fighters and attack helicopters, supplemented as appropriate by IDF artillery and M Multiple-Launch Rocket System MLRS fire against known Hezbollah positions south of the Litani River, rather than to resort to any early commitment of Israeli troops in a pitched battle against Hezbollah forces on the ground.

That, however, did not occur once Operation Change of Direction was at the brink of being initiated. Instead of choosing to implement the existing and well-developed plan, the IDF chief and his civilian superiors in the Olmert government. Although its success was not publicized at the time either by IDF spokesmen or by representatives of the Olmert government, Operation Mishkal Sguli discussed in fuller detail in Chapter Three was carried out without an apparent hitch during the early morning hours of July It had the intended effect of immediately diverting all incoming flights to alternate landing facilities throughout the region.

The FI, deliveries of which began in , is a two-seat multirole strike fighter developed expressly to satisfy unique IAF operational requirements. Its crew consists of a pilot in the forward cockpit who serves as aircraft commander and flies the aircraft and a weapons systems officer WSO in the aft cockpit who manages other complex mission details. This facility, a major instrument of Hezbollah information operations and an entity that had been branded a terrorist organization by both the Israeli and U. It was later learned that the station had preexisting emergency plans for just such a contingency, with exits identified and staff briefed on how to get out quickly if the building were to come under attack and with alternate transmission sites ready to take over so that the station could continue broadcasting.

Johnson, U. In an attempted foray into cyberspace. The first formal operational order issued by the IDF General Staff on July 13, which referred to the unfolding campaign as Operation Just Reward, expressly stated that the campaign would be, at least at the outset, exclusively a standoff, fires-based, and openended counteroffensive. It did not announce or implement what a later assessment sponsored by the U. In the end, however, it was unable to stop Hezbollah from continuing to transmit throughout the day campaign.

In that earlier instance, the antennas of the Arabiclanguage Al Jazeera television station in Baghdad were struck by U. Interview with Major General Daniel J. In addition to the Beirut international airport and the Al Manar television facility, targets struck on July 13 included Hezbollah headquarters complexes, training camps, munitions storage facilities, major road arteries including the main overland highway connecting Beirut and Damascus , bridges in southern Lebanon, television and cellular telephone transmission towers, and observation posts along the border with Israel.

In addition to the continual barrage of short-range Katyushas, a medium-range rocket landed in Haifa late in the afternoon of July That was the deepest that Hezbollah had struck into Israel to that point. Several of these landed deep inside the country near the town of Afula 30 miles south of the Lebanese border.

Impressively, orbiting IAF combat aircraft, sometimes cued by real-time UAV surveillance, repeatedly responded with time-sensitive targeting TST attacks that destroyed, often within single-digit minutes, the launchers that had fired the rockets. All the same, Nasrallah threatened more longer-range attacks if Israel did not promptly cease its aerial and artillery bombardment. The aerial attacks on the dahiye began during the early evening of July All civilians were assessed as having previously evacuated the area after the IDF gave a hour advance warning that it intended to attack.

In the initial strike wave, a number of known and confirmed Hezbollah headquarters buildings some of them 15 stories high were hit by 23 2,lb satellite-aided GBU joint direct attack munitions JDAMs delivered by FIs. A second missile that was targeted against another Israeli ship overflew Hanit and, apparently inadvertently, struck and sunk a foreign merchant vessel cruising 35 miles off the Lebanese coast.

Hanit, for her part, was disabled by the C missile but remained afloat, got out of the line of fire, and eventually made her way back to Ashdod for repairs under her own power. IDF intelligence officials strongly suspected that a team of skilled Iranian technical experts either fired or supervised the firing of the C against Hanit.

You will very soon discover how much your new government is stupid and inexperienced. You wanted war? Believe me, the response will reach beyond Haifa and beyond that. You wanted a change in the game rules— you will get it. According to informed IDF sources, the initial attack on the dahiye rattled Nasrallah, if only fleetingly, to a point where he was said to have come almost completely unglued.

In response, those facilities were promptly struck by IAF attack helicopters. They also dropped leaflets warning civilian residents to stay away from known enemy rocket storage and launch sites, munitions depots, and headquarters facilities. With respect to operations in the third area, IAF aircraft dropped leaflets for the second day in a row, warning civilian residents in southern Lebanon to move north of the Litani River to avoid being inadvertently injured or killed by IDF attacks on known Hezbollah military assets.

Some 70 percent of the Shiite population living in that narrow strip of land reportedly heeded the warnings. IAF attack helicopters later reattacked the fuel storage facilities at the Rafiq Hariri International Airport as strike fighters worked the main road connecting the airport to downtown Beirut. IAF aircraft also repeatedly dropped leaflets over the Hezbollah-controlled suburbs of Beirut, warning civilians to evacuate the area before the impending strikes that were slated to follow soon thereafter.

We will not go part way and be held hostage again. Subsequent transfers of those shipments from Syria to Lebanon observed by IAF surveillance aircraft included naval missiles, Katyusha short-range rockets, and Iranian-made Fajr 3 and Fajr 5 medium-range rockets. Upon confirmation of this, a reactive IAF air attack shredded an armsladen convoy of trucks that had originated at Camp Zabadani and then entered Lebanon en route to Hezbollah consumers.

This could entangle Syria in a battle with us. Bush for an accelerated delivery of MLRS battlefield rockets that are fired in barrages to deliver cluster bomb units CBUs dispensing hundreds of submunitions. With respect to that request, the U. The IDF initially had sought the rockets for contingency use against conventional armies in case Israel was invaded.

Former Prime Minister Barak and former government minister Dan Meridor likewise voiced mounting doubts over the direction that the Olmert government had taken, adding that any decision to continue the bombing would inevitably court disaster 53 David S. Such protestations, however, had no effect on the Olmert government. The air force has just about used up all of its known targets. We are two weeks away. A former director of AMAN, since-retired Major General Uri Saguy, proposed in this vein that the government should set more realistic and attainable goals, assess more carefully its expectations of what was in the realm of the achievable, and not overreach in seeking an agreeable outcome.

Instructions were issued for a limited operation against limited targets, but we were unable to limit the duration of the fighting. The end always takes longer than the beginning. But once stabilization generates a feeling of satiation and exhaustion, perhaps international involvement will begin, and after this, diplomatic contacts. One goal of those forays was to take Hezbollah combatants alive. Still another was to identify and validate new targets for aerial attack. They participated far less in covert combat operations in areas closer to the land battlefront just north of the Israeli border where IDF conventional forces were soon to predominate.

It will take time. We aim to change the situation and not go back to where we were. Israel did reject it, however, categorically. Times, July 21, The Move to Ground Operations On July 20, in its largest troop call-up in four years, the IDF mobilized three reserve divisions and concurrently broadcast warnings for all civilians residing in southern Lebanon to evacuate to safer environs north of the Litani.

There had been rampant confusion over both mission and objectives when IDF troops first entered Lebanon in more than token strength the day before. Ground attacks. The assaults were aimed at neutralizing individual targets close to the border and did not seem to be planned as part of a larger overall land campaign. The problem is the will to launch. We have to break the will of Hezbollah. Maybe many of their soldiers are fanatics and want to be martyrs. But the leadership is clever, and it wants to live. On July 21, the U.

House of Representatives passed by a —8 margin a resolution strongly supporting Israel in the confrontation. I mean direct fighting between our soldiers face to face. They hide in holes in the ground. They have so many places to hide from the air strikes, so we have to send in the infantry. It can be dangerous. Hezbollah immediately claimed to have brought down the aircraft, but the loss was later determined to have been caused by a catastrophic main rotor failure. If Hezbollah does not experience defeat in this war, this will spell the end of Israeli deterrence against its enemies.

Greg Myre and Craig S. The Olmert government, however, continued at that point to opt for maintaining the existing level of operations on the ground, recognizing that a major escalation would bring about no instant solution to the Katyusha problem. They were, however, able to monitor some IDF radio transmissions that were often made in the clear, as was attested by captured Hezbollah radios that were widely depicted in Western press accounts. When an Israeli SOF team encountered them on one occasion during a firefight, the Israeli team members thought at first that they had somehow become commingled with a separate detachment of Israeli SEALs.

That disciplined practice made for a significant challenge for IDF intelligence. Army War College, U. Army War College Class of , p. Responding to that situation, the IAF provided abundant on-call CAS with heavy air strikes, often in so-called danger-close conditions meaning that friendly forces in need of immediate fire support are within meters of a designated target , and many wounded IDF troops were provided prompt medical evacuation by IAF UH Blackhawk helicopters under heavy fire.

On some occasions, the IAF even delivered 2,pound precisionguided bombs on request within meters of friendly positions with no instances of fratricide.

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In some instances, he even had to be awakened in the middle of the night to give weapons release approval in danger-close conditions. Afterward, some informed U. They scored big time in the psychological warfare department. The danger-close criteria loosened up over the course of the ground fighting, with both fighter and attack helicopter pilots being granted increasingly greater personal discretion to make their own judgment calls toward the end. Precision munitions were dropped either on assigned mensurated target coordinates in the case of JDAM or on laser-designator spots in the case of LGBs.

There were no reported instances of IAF fighter aircrews having been asked to conduct strafing passes. You must bring this before the government. You need to tell them straight that without a major ground operation, we cannot remove the Katyusha threat. If the government does not approve it. As a result of that timely targeting, the pilot succeeded in killing a senior Hezbollah leader, Nur Shalhoub, and several other terrorists while they were in a moving vehicle transporting rockets.

With respect to the now-mounting incidence of IDF casualties that had begun to occur on the ground in Lebanon during the battle of Bint 86 Halutz.


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We must go on and do what we are committed to doing. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Jerusalem at the time for consultations aimed at bringing about an acceptable end to the fighting as soon as practicable, declared that a ceasefire was now on the immediate horizon. Up to that point, the main goal of the drawn-out U. Then, in a major setback to ongoing efforts to arrange for a timely ceasefire, an IAF attack on a complex of targeted houses after midnight on July 30 in the southern Lebanese village of Qana inadvertently killed what were at first thought to be as many as 50 or more civilians, including women and children.

The targeted complex had been a confirmed source of as many as recent Katyusha rocket launches into Israel. The incident sparked an instant wave of interna-. It mattered not that the collateral-damage incident discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four was unintended by the IAF, that senior Israeli officials promptly expressed regret and their apologies, that the actual number of noncombatants killed and injured proved to be substantially fewer than that initially reported, or even that there was a suspicious aspect of the incident a second explosion in the targeted house apparently occurred several hours after the moment of impact and detonation of the IAF-delivered munition.

The world was revulsed over what became widely spotlighted in every major capital as Israeli indifference to the time-honored principle of noncombatant immunity under the laws of armed conflict. Not a single Hezbollah rocket landed in Israel at any time during the two-day suspension of fire, after a record rockets the day before and the day before that.

After the initial hue and cry raised by the Qana incident began to abate, the IDF announced its intention to review its standing rules of engagement ROE to further minimize the likelihood of any recur91 Interview. No enemy territory gained, no enemy leaders killed, no abatement of the missile barrage that has sent a million Israelis from their homes and workplaces.

Stephens was previously the editor of the Jerusalem Post. Attack helicopter pilots spoke over the radio directly with engaged IDF brigade commanders. Fighter aircrews, in contrast, spoke only. Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, the Bush administration continued to insist that there could be no ceasefire until a plan was in place to disarm Hezbollah. It had the advantage of intimate familiarity with its operating arena, as well as organization in small and loosely connected secret cells that were inherently difficult to hunt down.

The intent now was for the IDF to insert as many as 10, troops into southern Lebanon in an attempt to create a buffer zone free of Katyushas, with the initial contingent of troops already in or around more than a dozen towns and villages as far as four miles inside the border. Now we want to clear Hezbollah from all areas near the border. Our plan is to push north on a much larger scale. The IAF was now conducting an almost nonstop series of daily air attacks on the dahiye in southern Beirut, preceded in each case by the dropping of leaflets warning all civilians to evacuate the area.

By August 5, some 10, IDF troops had advanced into southern Lebanon, although no more than four miles into Hezbollah-occupied territory, with another 5, poised on the Israeli side of the border to join them. Peretz, a career politician, had previously dealt mainly with domestic social and economic matters.

Peretz further insisted that IDF forces would not withdraw from southern Lebanon until a credible international peacekeeping force was in place. Cloud formations begin in the beginning of September. This is the price that has to be paid so that the operation will have an impact on the entire campaign. There remained rampant reluctance at all echelons of the IDF to follow through with Steven.

Our soldiers just want to do this job and go home. But it came instead at the very last possible moment, just before the UN-brokered ceasefire was about to go into effect and amid pervasive unease about it throughout the IDF. There was an agreement [the ceasefire] and the forces must be stopped. There is absolutely no sense in getting more soldiers killed. On the ground, people get hurt. Too many people. So far, this has not been in an organized way. Secretary of State Rice cautioned, however, that the ceasefire would not go into effect immediately and that she and UN Secretary General Annan would need to consult first with Israel and Lebanon to set a definitive date.

The same day that UN Security Council Resolution was approved, Olmert authorized the IDF to begin final preparations for expanding its ground involvement in southern Lebanon, while at the same time announcing his intent to ask his cabinet to accept the Security Council resolution. By this time, Olmert had come under increasingly heavy fire at home. Thirty percent felt that Israel was losing the war, and 43 percent said that there would be no winners or losers.

The majority of respondents in all polls favored expanding ground operations and faulted both the Olmert government and the IDF for not having taken more forceful ground action earlier. August 12, This could be cited as further evidence that a major failing on the part of the Olmert government in its conduct of the campaign may have been poor communication regarding its actions and intentions with the Israeli population.

The opinions reported above, after all, were only perceptions. The reality, arguably, was that the IDF at this stage of its counteroffensive was actually making significant progress against Hezbollah. Colley, RAF, January 11, The formal order for forward-deployed IDF units to move out reached Northern Command headquarters at on August It was passed downward a half hour later to the tasked IDF brigades and battalions.

Accordingly, with the ceasefire now only days away, Olmert and Peretz stepped out with dispatch to escalate substantially on the ground by ordering the deployed IDF divisions to advance all the way to the Litani. During the final hour window of combat, the IDF tripled its number of troops in Lebanon and substantially ramped up the intensity of its standoff attacks to include, for the first time, the use of a significant number of rocket- and artillery-delivered CBUs. IAF air attacks also increased in number and intensity and ranged across the entire length and breadth of Lebanon.

That number represented around 45 percent of all IAF sorties flown throughout the day war. Not surprisingly, the IDF suffered its highest casualty rate during the last three days of peak-intensity fighting. Coordination among force elements was said to have been uniformly poor throughout the final phase of the campaign. As anticipated, the ceasefire previously agreed to by all involved parties went into effect on August 14, with civilians in northern Israel at long last emerging from their bomb shelters and vehicular movement gradually resuming throughout Lebanon.

Only after all forces gained situational awareness on 12 August was the IDF able to synchronize its overwhelming firepower and take the high ground in Ghandourieyeh by the morning of 13 August. I saw one Armored Corps battalion commander, a career battalion commander, and when I looked him in the eye, I saw they were blank, empty, because he was going to take his battalion into Lebanon that night, and he had never led a battalion anywhere at night. I am grateful to Eliot Cohen of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies for bringing this intriguing question to my attention.

Eliot A. Eventually, bowing to that criticism, he consented to a full independent inquiry. Early accounts varied on the total number of IDF casualties incurred. Of the soldiers who lost their lives, 30 were members of tank crews. A total of Merkava tanks were committed to combat. Five were destroyed by powerful underbelly mines, with 45 to 50 more roughly 10 percent of the total number of tanks committed to the ground fighting by the IDF hit by Hezbollah ATGMs and 21 penetrated, some more than once.

Peretz resigned from the government, and Olmert also eventually resigned, although in the wake of and as a consequence of an unrelated political scandal. After the fighting ended, there were reports of as many as 8, unexploded CBU submunitions scattered about southern Lebanon that were the residue of IDF artillery and MLRS attacks against suspected Hezbollah rocket sites and other targets in open terrain.

One-third of the latter were said to have been children. A total of 3, Lebanese civilians were reported wounded, with around 10, homes destroyed, 22, buildings badly damaged, and 73, more partially damaged. Interview with Brigadier General [Res. For the most part, in those mission areas in which it naturally excelled, the IAF performed to its usual high standards of competence throughout its day engagement against Hezbollah.

Viewed in hindsight, its accomplishments in both planning and execution stand as the principal remaining untold story of Operation Change of Direction.

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Table 3. To be sure, the airspace over Lebanon presented a relatively benign operating environment for the IAF. There were no air-to-air threats or significant enemy surface defenses to contend with, aside from sporadic fire from infrared surface-to-air missiles SAMs and antiaircraft artillery AAA. Figure 3. Yet, like any good commander, he also instructed IAF planners and aircrews to take all reasonable risks that they deemed essential for accomplishing their assigned missions. The pilot and WSO both ejected successfully, but the aircraft was destroyed.

A day later, two AHA Apache attack helicopters returning from a combat mission just after midnight collided near Ramat Neftali about two miles inside the Israeli border, after the pilot of one experienced a system malfunction and was attempting to make an emergency landing. One pilot was killed in the collision and the other three crewmembers were injured, one severely.

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One of the Apaches was lost in the accident. The other sustained considerable damage but was said at the time to be possibly repairable. It also is configured with indigenously produced command-and-control and electronic warfare systems. In all, out of a total of nearly 19, sorties flown throughout the campaign, the IAF experienced one aircraft lost in combat from enemy fire and three more from accidents.

In the end, the most notable combat achievements by the IAF were its hitherto-unprecedented level of sustained combat sortie-generation activity, its first-ever preemptive offensive against an enemy ballisticmissile array, its skillful integration of UAVs into both independent air operations and joint air-ground combat, its courageous mobility and combat search and rescue CSAR operations under fire, and its downing of two hard-to-engage Hezbollah Ababil UAVs of unknown mission intent by an air-to-air missile fired by an FC.

The discussion that follows looks more fully in turn into each of these five achievements. It also featured the most complex air-warfare effort in more than six decades of IDF service to the State of Israel. The IAF launched its offensive with no prior notice and with no opportunity for a final rehearsal of its initial strikes. Yet it reached full operational swing before the end of the first day of combat. Within these four operating areas, IAF aircraft over the course of the campaign struck some 7, targets out of a total of around 15, identified and geolocated candidates at a rate of roughly combat sorties a day, depending on mission tasking.

More than half those sorties were flown at night. As noted in Chapter Two, the first 24 hours of the war typified the air operations flow that followed over the ensuing 33 days. After that, with so few remaining fixed and targetable enemy assets of any real military worth, most IAF air operations entailed armed overwatch patrols and TST attacks against pop-up targets of opportunity. In most cases, target approvals were granted with a minimum of delay in the main AOC. The daily air tasking process was said to have been invariably responsive and fast.

Almost 12, of those were fighter sorties in all mission categories, with attack helicopters racking up another 2, sorties. IAF fighters normally operated in two-ship elements rather than in larger 8 All preplanned targets were approved by target category. In addition, combat medevac sorties were flown, 94 of which entailed emergency rescue operations under fire. Forty of those were daylight missions carried out against all IAF safety rules, at great risk, and in the face of multiple operational hazards.

In some cases, IAF attack helicopter pilots pressed their attacks as close to their intended targets as the tactical imperatives of the moment appeared to warrant, even though they were under IAF headquarters direction to maintain a safe standoff range. Those instances were rare, however, despite the fact that the assessed need for such close support from the perspective of engaged IDF ground commanders was both constant and high. The 10 Interview. In a related measure of note, the number of IAF attack helicopter sorties flown against Hezbollah in was twice the number flown during Operation Accountability and Operation Grapes of Wrath the first Lebanon war combined.

Compared with the three weeks of major combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom in early , Operation Change of Direction lasted longer 34 days as opposed to 21 , saw the release of almost as many air-delivered munitions 21, compared with 29, , and featured more than half the daily aerial munitions delivery rate compared with 1, In all, IAF fighters and attack helicopters expended 7, precision air-delivered laser-guided, satellite-aided, or electro-optically guided munitions.

In sum, 14 Ben-Israel,. Participating fighter aircrews flew an average of two sorties a day during the campaign. Most sorties lasted only 45 minutes to 1. The vast majority of the fighter sorties flown during Operation Change of Direction were devoted to various ground-attack mission assignments. However, some Fs and FCs flew around-the-clock defensive counterair DCA orbits over the Mediterranean just west of the Lebanese coast, mainly to hedge against the possibility of a surprise launch by Hezbollah of armed Ababil UAVs and air-breathing missiles into Israeli airspace.

However, the IAF aircraft, and the final third were mission-ready reservists who flew weekly with line squadrons to maintain their operational currency. Accordingly, its light gray Fs have always carried a secondary ground-attack mission tasking. With respect to airspace management, there were often 40 to 70 IAF aircraft operating concurrently over the compact war zone of southern Lebanon.

Accordingly, there was a continual hail of LGBs, JDAMs, and accurately aimed unguided bombs falling through the airspace assigned to IAF aircraft on station in the lower altitude blocks, making flawless time and space deconfliction an ever-present airspace management requirement over the war zone.

The airspace congestion and deconfliction challenge faced by the IAF over southern Lebanon was highly reminiscent of a nearly identical situation that the air component of U. Central Command experienced during its ultimately successful effort to support embattled U. For an account of the latter experience, see Benjamin S. The G special electronic mission aircraft is a national collection asset tasked directly by the Ministry of Defense. More than in any previous IAF air-to-ground combat involvement, precsion attack played a prominent role in Operation Change of Direction.

Precision-guided munitions PGMs made up 36 percent of the total number of air-delivered weapons expended. Considering solely targets in built-up areas where collateral-damage avoidance was a. Of the plus satellite-aided JDAMs that were delivered against targeted structures in the dahiye, a full percent were reportedly released within valid parameters and presumably hit their assigned aim points, as was later attested by weapon-system video and UAV imagery, with no known misses.

The image on the right side indicates the precise nature of the strike operation. Only specifically targeted buildings were destroyed. The IAF used unguided munitions and CBUs principally against area targets for which consistently high accuracy was not required. When configured with a wing kit, the munition has a standoff range of greater than 37 miles, considerably more than. It features an electro-optical guidance sensor for terminal-phase target updates by matching a large scene with what the seeker sees.

Only if an electro-optical target match cannot be made because of smoke or cloud obscurations will the munition revert to GPS navigation. These issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircrews employed them during the three weeks of major combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom in early Today, thanks to the continuing revolution in global connectivity, a real-time common operating picture has now become available to IAF combatants at all levels, from the most senior leadership all the way down to operators engaged with enemy forces at the tactical level.

It is a single-stage, solidpropellant, road-mobile weapon armed with a single 1,lb highexplosive warhead. The only significant difference between the Zelzal 1 and the Zelzal 2 is that the latter is 1, lb heavier. With its mile range as opposed to 78 for the Zelzal 1 , the Zelzal 2 can reach from central Lebanon as far into Israel as the heavily populated northern outskirts of Tel Aviv.

In addition, the terrorist organization also had an assessed inventory of hundreds of Syrian-supplied mm and mm rockets with ranges of 43 and 71 miles, respectively. Although the most advanced Iranian Zelzal 3 is assessed as possibly having a rudimentary inertial guidance system, the Zelzal 1 and 2 variants provided to Hezbollah by Iran are unguided and hence useful only as terror weapons with considerable explosive punch. Even when properly launched, both variants are accurate at their respective ranges.

The Zelzal 2 spins in flight for added stability. Both require a large transportererector-launcher TEL , which presents a large infrared and radar signature for targeting whenever the TEL is out in the open. As noted above, the poor accuracy of the rockets renders them useless militarily, but the large warhead makes them highly effective as indiscriminant countervalue weapons, which is the use to which they would have been put by Nasrallah had he succeeded in launching any against Israel. Some were armed with fragmentation warheads for use against exposed personnel.

When they returned to Lebanon, they covertly delivered loads of long-range Zelzals. In principle, the longest-range Zelzals had the ability to strike as far into Israel as the Tel Aviv—Jerusalem corridor and perhaps farther to Ashdod. This collection effort was said to have ultimately informed an IAF master target roster that contained mensurated coordinates for more than 4, identified target aim points of interest throughout Lebanon.

If it is to be believed, one of the above-noted networks reportedly even succeeded in installing miniaturized SIGINT equipment within three 39 Makovsky. The underlying CONOPS was finetuned by the IAF many times over the course of those six years and was practiced repeatedly in large-force training exercises against a simulated layout of the target complex that the IAF had built in southern Israel.

See Figure 3. At that point, the fighter squadrons that had been tasked with carrying out the operation were cleared to begin their final mission planning and aircrew briefing. The strike force consisted of 40 FI and FI multirole fighters in all, plus additional F variants and a supporting array of UAVs of various types. According to a former director of AMAN, the IAF received its targeting intelligence for the rocket attacks from AMAN, whose target intelligence staff produced digit grid coordinates that could then be programmed into a strike Figure 3.

Most of the munitions used for precision target attack were satelliteaided JDAMs. Participating aircrews were able to perform effective real-time BDA in many cases through the use of their onboard infrared targeting pods. The IAF later determined that probably around 50 percent of the Fajrs had actually been destroyed in the initial attack.

In the end, however, around 20 Lebanese civilians most likely Hezbollah supporters or sympathizers were killed in the operation, 10 to 20 times fewer than the number that had been originally anticipated. In the immediate aftermath of Operation Mishkal Sguli, AMAN officials were said to have believed that most of the Fajr 3s had been prepositioned and accordingly taken out during the opening-night attack.

Not long thereafter, however, mobile transporters equipped with 14 launch tubes began making an appearance and firing rockets intermittently into the vicinity of Haifa. Seconds later, the launcher was destroyed. The Fajr 5 also emerged in both prepositioned and mobile versions, with the latter version featuring up to four rockets per launcher. In the process, its aircrews quickly learned how to manage the mediumrange rocket threat using an approach that yielded an effective integration of command and control, ISR, and strike assets for going after pop-up targets of opportunity.

Before long, the IAF was consistently able to target and destroy detected mobile launchers within 45 seconds to a minute after their rockets were fired by means of closely fused UAV imagery, counterbattery radar, and precision munitions. IAF armed overwatch patrols also had considerable apparent effectiveness in interdicting the flow of resupply rockets coming in from Syria. These were all significant combat accomplishments by the IAF. In a revealing illustration of such accomplishments, Figure 3. The two infrared images on the left were taken by a UAV as the launcher had fired a rocket just after having been detected by a previous launch flash and geolocated.

In the third image to the right, the launcher is seconds 53 Steven.

Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran

The kill cycle from detection to target destruction in this instance was no more than a minute. Once you have these capabilities integrated, you can react quickly to precise intelligence. Also as noted above, no long-range Zelzals and relatively few medium-range Fajrs were successfully fired into Israel by Hezbollah. Mishkal Sguli] could be untrue. Knowledgeable IAF officers have also expressed confidence that subsequent well-targeted attacks against identified and geolocated Zelzal storage facilities also largely negated that pivotal Hezbollah capability, thus preventing Nasrallah from making good on his recurrent threats to fire longer-range rockets at Tel Aviv.

The fact that no Zelzal was ever launched into Israel at 57 Arkin,. Both hypotheses are equally plausible. In rare instances in which a digital data link was not available, target coordinates were passed by encrypted. It also continued to refine this TST capability throughout the 34 days of fighting. From the fifth day onward, every detected medium-range Hezbollah rocket launcher in southern Lebanon was destroyed by aerial attack either before or immediately after launching its first weapon.

In the medium-range rocket hunt, thanks to timely real-time target detection and aircrew cueing, 20 percent of the launchers were successfully struck before launch. The other 80 percent of the launch positions were destroyed within minutes after the launch. It was an unprecedented challenge.

This recollection would appear to put a decisive lie to the view expressed by a. That effort evidently bore tangible fruit during Operation Change of Direction. However, to repeat an important point expressed at the outset of this book, the Katyushas were never a responsibility that the IDF had ever assigned to the IAF.