Sentido y ser en Heidegger. Una aproximación al problema del lenguaje (Spanish Edition)
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In Sobre a origem do poder civil. Coimbra: Tenacitas, La querelle des possibles. See ch. Cantens, Bernardo J. Carraud, Vincent. Causa sive ratio. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Freddoso, A. South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, Glauser, Richard. In The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene , ed. Randall E. Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn, Chicago: Open Court, Lohr, Charles H. In Res et verba in der Renaissance , ed.
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Frank Grunert and Kurt Seelmann, Delgado, Mariano. Konrad Wegmann et al. Elorduy, Eleuterio. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Pasquale Porro, In Heidegger e i medievali , ed. Costantino Esposito and Pasquale Porro, Freddoso, Alfred J. Elmar J. Kremer and Michael J. Latzer, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Einige Thesen von Francisco Suarez'.
Karofsky, Amy D. Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 : Karofsky, Amy. Medieval Philosophy and Theology 10 : Philotheos 1 : Murphy, Paul V. Archivum Historicum Societatis Jesu Comillas: Comillas Pontifical University, Secada, Jorge. Encyclopedia of Ethics , 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, Zur Transformation der Demokratietheorie zu Beginn der Neuzeit'. In Potentia Dei. Milan: F. Angeli, London: Cassell, The Modern Schoolman 77 : Sapientia 55 : Daniel, Stephen H. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 : Theologie und Philosophie 75 : In L'elaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Age , Kronen, John D.
The Review of Metaphysics In Etica y sociologia , ed. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, Menn, Stephen. Perspectives on Science 8 : Ulrich Rudolph and Dominik Perler, Specht, Rainer. Norbert Brieskorn and Markus Riedenauer, vol. I, In Philosophen der Renaissance , ed. Paul Richard Blum, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Blanchette, Olivia. Boulnois, Olivier. Paris: P. Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa. Brookfield, VT: Aldershot, In Discursos y representaciones en la Edad Media.
Actas de las VI Jornadas Medievales , ed. Lisbon: Colibri, Nature et empire de la loi: Etudes suareziennes. In Histoire de la philosophie politique , ed. Alain Renaut, II, Philosophisches Jahrbuch In Religion and International Law , ed. Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Festschrift F. Coriando, Foisneau, Luc. Yves Charles Zarka, Paris: PUF, Godoy-Torales, Juan R.
Goudriaan, Asa. Persona y derecho 40 : Montag, John. In Radical Orthodoxy. A New Theology , Nicol, Eduardo. Propriedad y comunidad'. Mexico City: Colegio de Mexico, Clericalismo jesuita y estado moderno. Hildesheim: G. Olms, Scannone, Juan Carlos. Buenos Aires: Bonum, Baciero, Carlos. Arbor : Annali chieresi 14 : Forteza, Bartomeu.
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Gomez Robledo, Ignacio. In Was ist philosophie im Mittelalter , ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer, Miscellanea Medievalia Gracia, In Routledge History of Philosophy , ed. John Marenbon, vol. Stephen F. Brown, II, The Theory of the Pure Object. Winter, Oakley, Francis. Iberoamericana Pragensia 32 : Rinaldi, Teresa.
Francisco Suarez: Cognitio singularis materialis: De Anima. Bari: Levante, In Entwicklung der Methodenlehre in Rechtswissenschaft und Philosophie vom April , ed. Review of Metaphysics 51 : Brill's Studies in Intellectual History Baert, Edward. Burlando, Gianniana. In Descartes et le Moyen Age , ed. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, In Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery , ed. Kevin White, Olivo, Gilles. Ong-Van-Cung, Kim-Sang. In Descartes et le Moyen-Age , ed. Ramelow, Tilman. Gott, Freiheit und Weltenwahl. Die Metaphysik der Willensfreiheit zwischen A.
Teoria, storia e applicazione. Dalla Grecia classica a F. Acta philosophica 6 : Schrock, Thomas S. Interpretation 25 : In Lire Descartes aujourd'hui , ed. Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, Atlanta: Scholars Press, Aubin, Vincent. Luce Giard and Louis de Vaucelles. Des Chene, Dennis. In La Universidad Complutense Cisneriana. Madrid: Editorial Complutense, Marion, Jean-Luc.
In Descartes: Principia Philosophiae , ed. Jean-Robert Armogathe and Giulia Belgioioso, Napoli, Mertz, D. Moderate Realism and Its Logic. New Haven: Yale University Press, Placher, William C. Louisville, Ky. Ashworth, E. Vivarium 33 : Benavent Vidal, Enrique. Amigos de Dios. Valencia, Cardoso, Adelino. Le Disputationes metaphysicae nella critica contemporanea'. In La filosofia nel Siglo de Oro. Studi sul tardo Rinascimento spagnolo , ed. Ada Lamacchia, Ferraro, Domenico. Itinerari del volontarismo.
Lombardo, Mario Gaetano. Enti di ragione e bene trascendentale in Suarez, Leibniz, Kant. Milano: Istituto Propaganda Libraria, Pisa: ETS, Spruit, Leen. Thompson, A. Thomas Aquinas'. Angelicum 72 : Uscatescu Barron, J. Pensamiento 51 : Burlando, Giannina Leonora. In Anales Valentinos 40 : Individuation in Scholasticism. New York: S. Press, Rome: Gregorian University, Modern Schoolman 72 : American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 68 : Kremer, Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, Dutton, B.
The Modern Schoolman 70 : American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67 : Kobusch, Theo. In idem, Die Entdeckung der Person. Metaphysik der Freiheit und modernes Menschenbild , Descartes, Suarez, et la question de l' ens per se '. In Descartes et Regius. Autour de l'explication de l'esprit humain , ed. Theo Verbeek, Amsterdam: Rodopi, Volpi, Franco.
Beuchot, Mauricio. Doctor Communis 45 : Campa, Riccardo. In idem, I trattatisti spagnoli del diritto delle gente , Madrid: Union Printing Editori, Fordham International Law Journal Pensamiento 48 : Topoi 11 : The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 : American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 : Scott McDonald, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, The Modern Schoolman The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly Lloyd, Howell A. James Henderson Burns and Mark Goldie, Meron, Theodor. American Journal of International Law Barcelona: Promociones Publicaciones Universitarias, Cuadernos de pensamiento 6 : PhD Diss.
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Salmon, John H. Stimmen der Zeit : Treloar, John L. Bastit, Michel. Naissance de la loi moderne. The Modern Schoolman 68 : Honnefelder, Ludger. Scientia transcendens. Hamburg: Meiner, Schepers , ed. Heinekamp, W. Lenzen, and M. Schneider, Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 : Les Etudes philosophiques 44 : In Homenaje a D. Ignacio Valls , Casula, M. Von F. Filosofia Oggi 12 : Le tournant suarezien'. Gomez Robledo, Antonio. Anales Valentinos 28 : Vivarium 26 : Thomas V. Morris, Vivarium 25 : In Semiotics , ed. Jonathan Evans and John Deely, New York: University Press of America, Ewbank, M.
In The Metaphysics of Substance , ed. III Foucault la subjetividad y el poder. Por lo tanto no existen para Foucault las condiciones para que el poder llegue a un punto en que cese de ser, es decir un punto en que reine la paz del sin-poder. Por el contrario el poder quiere la guerra, necesita de estrategias para superar otros poderes. En tanto que somos poder, en nuestro quehacer producimos, y somos llamados a producir, discursos que al aparecer niegan irremediablemente otros discursos, y otras maneras de ser. El nuevo poder es un poder disciplinante que nos vigila constantemente.
No solo lo prohibido, ni lo separado e. Para Foucault existe entonces una lucha de estrategias que tienen ciertos fines y medios para conseguirlos. El fin primordial es superar al otro, obtener la victoria es depravar al otro de los medios de combatir en donde. El Otro es puesto como tal por el Uno al definirse como Uno. Este, a grandes rasgos y dejando de lado muchos detalles, es el modelo de identidad a seguir que el Uno favorece. Este proceso se da a tres niveles interdependientes pero analizables independientemente. Igualmente participamos de ella universalmente.
La afinidad entre ambas obras es impresionante. La historia del desarrollo del lenguaje y de las formaciones sociales tiene como fin investigativo el desenmascaramiento de unas acciones encubridoras que han llegado a gobernar la realidad de las modernos estados comerciales. DOD , y Apropiadamente nos da entonces un ejemplo de aquello a lo que se refiere. Los humanos son en este sentido iguales irrespectivamente del sitio de origen y de sus conocimientos. DOD , Es sin duda que por ello Rousseau nos dice a todos:. DOD El lenguaje tiene su origen en eventos naturales, de hecho es en el punto de origen en el que la naturaleza nos hablaba directamente, en nuestra interioridad.
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Debemos prepararnos no tanto para hablar, como para saber escuchar. Tanto las pasiones complejas, como el habla son inexistentes pues ni siquiera las uniones familiares han surgido. Somos apasionados por y gracias a otros. Sin embargo, aunque separados, incluso a este nivel podemos hablar ya de un lenguaje en virtud a la clase de seres que somos. En este momento de nuestra historia el lenguaje y la naturaleza permanecen indiferenciables pues se hayan ambos entremezclados en nosotros. Los humanos primitivos son por ello mismo seres altamente sanos, no comparten lo que para Rousseau es nuestra enfermiza reflexividad DOD , Y dado que dicho acto y dicho lenguaje no es necesario a este nivel, la moralidad no es articulada en su complejidad.
Pero sin embargo permanecemos incluso a este nivel, como claramente diferenciables de los animales. Hemos sido des-naturalizados, pero no completamente civilizados. Es al investigar el surgimiento de los lenguajes meridionales que se nos revela esta ambivalencia que permea la obra de Rousseau.
Paulatinamente dejamos para siempre nuestra vida solitaria en que la voz de la naturaleza nos hablaba directamente. Este fue el primer paso hacia la desigualdad y , al mismo tiempo, hacia el vicio DOD Como vimos, el primer lenguaje fue el de la voz de la naturaleza. Para Starobinsky:.
Pero lo que es absolutamente crucial en este relato es que el hecho de que uno llegue a hablar un lenguaje particular realmente afecta el modo en que uno percibe el mundo, los otros, y consecuentemente lo que uno mismo es. Es por esto que es de este estado del que realmente podemos decir que:. Su presencia destructiva posterga una ausencia, la de la apariencia que nunca es. De la violencia abierta del final de las sociedades patriarcales, llegamos ahora a la violencia escondida de las palabras. El lenguaje sirve ahora la causa de la ausencia; la apariencia obstruye la presencia de la autenticidad.
Nos escondemos en las palabras y en el silencio. Somos esclavos con cadenas hasta internas. Somos de nuevo absolutamente iguales. Pero si bien esto es cierto, la virtud del CS radica precisamente en su lucha contra tales presuposiciones. El yo se considera bajo esta perspectiva como un ser interesado que busca, primordialmente, su propio bienestar en el espacio privado; es incluso su deber.
Pero como dijimos anteriormente, no por la presencia de la diferencia caemos en un relativismo total. Estos tampoco son entregados simplemente por dinero:. La palabra finanzas es una palabra de esclavo; es desconocida en la ciudad. Evidentemente el lenguaje de intereses comerciales es radicalmente limitado, a diferencia de Constant, por la austeridad de Rousseau. Pero limitar la incidencia de un lenguaje es bien diferente a rechazarlo de entrada.
Entre la naturaleza humana como ha llegado a ser, y la ley como debe ser, prima la primera ya escindida de su origen. Pero para Rousseau:. Ver en particular el ensayo de Starobinsky acerca del EOL , Satrob, Blum, Ejemplos nuestros de ser forzados a ser libres son: posibilidad de voto obligatorio y ley zanahoria. Company, Indianapolis, University Press, Cambridge, Europe , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, , pgs. Starobinsky, Jean, J. University Press, Princeton, Not being capable of undertaking such a massive enterprise, I propose instead to focus this comparative essay on the relationship between sexuality, sublimation and the human search for truth through narrative.
For instance, in his Group Psychology the German thinker writes concerning the centrality of sexuality in the overall picture of psychoanalysis:. However, this claim is so strong that it cannot but puzzle us. Instead it is of the nature of the dialogues to provide avenues for reflection, but no absolutely clear end roads where human reflection would become an impossibility.
Besides, the interaction between the different Platonic dialogues may actually provide varying, perhaps mutually conflicting views, on the nature of human eroticity. Or does he mean the three, somehow made commensurable? If this is so, then what ought we to do with all the other speeches? Why did Plato take the trouble of writing them in that order, with speakers the character of which clarify the nature of their speeches, and moreover, in such dramatic, and lively, fashion? I will carry this out by dividing this essay into two sections which perhaps can stand as mirror images to each other.
In the first I will try to shed some light on the dialogical nature of the Symposium. This involves, among other things, bringing to the fore what I take to be the central confrontation of the dialogue, that is to say, the always indirect battle of positions held between Aristophanes and to a minor extent Alcibiades and Socrates.
In their confrontation, I take it, lies the most important Platonic contribution to the understanding of the complexities and difficulties one runs into in seeking to comprehend the nature of our erotic longing as human beings, and perhaps even as potential Socrateses. The difficult issue of truth comes to light not in the personal, steadfast, and perhaps even stubborn adherence to one of the speeches, but rather in the critical acceptance of the dialogical interaction between the participants who together let us know that Eros, and the narration of Eros, are two sides of the same coin.
I will claim that by centering on the issue of the narrative character of psychoanalytic truth, i. The Symposium is a Platonic dialogue. Now, this may seem like an obvious claim, one which truly reveals nothing that is not self-evident. In the case of the Symposium in particular it is this dialogical characteristic which makes it evident that the Platonic understanding of the role of Eros in our lives is not simply identical to that of Socrates.
Perhaps we can even find in this dialogue a questioning of the Socratic adventure towards philosophical truth. This is nowhere clearer than in the silent confrontation found between the speeches of Aristophanes and that of Socrates. In order to see exactly what is at stake in their agonistic encounter I will center the discussion upon the words of the Greek comedian. But before doing so, one ought to keep in mind a parallel that constantly reappears between Aristophanes and Freud.
Aristophanes covers up the tragic nature of his brief speech on the nature of human erotic longing with the temporary soothing elements of comic myth. For Diotima the initiate in erotic understanding:. Then he must realize that the beauty that is in any body whatsoever is related to that in another body; and if he must pursue the beauty of looks, it is great folly not to believe that the beauty of all bodies is one and the same. Now, however that may turn out to be, it is likewise suspicious that towards the end of the dialogue Plato once again is quick to silence Aristophanes.
Socrates, in contrast, goes on sleepless to continue his contemplative activity at the Lyceum. How to understand this? Moreover, both speakers seems to hold allegiance to very different gods. Aristophanes is not by any means a measured Athenian gentleman. His disordering presence becomes even more evident precisely when his turn to speak arrives.
If Socrates rudely interrupts by his bodily inactivity the dinner to which he is invited d , Aristophanes rudely interrupts or perhaps is overtaken by his bodily activity, thus changing the original order of the speeches. Just when Pausanias has finished his sophisticated speech on pederasty, Aristophanes reveals that hiccups have gotten the best of him. Medicine rescues the comedian by putting forward the strongest of cures known to hiccuping, the soaking outbursts of sneezing.
That Aristophanes is not by any means thanking his doctor, is made evident by the laughter of all those present; a laughter which comes into conflict with the seriousness of the doctor who fights back by way of an aggressive challenge. The comic poet becomes now the doctor who must cure the excessive anger which bursts easily from the moderate physician. An apology which seems to imply that the previous speeches have somehow gone wrong.
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The brevity of the speech stands in stark contrast with its complexity. Too many issues are brought together and unfortunately, I cannot, nor know how to, deal with many of them. Aristophanes claims that the power of Eros lies in its providing us with the greatest possible happiness any human being could ever expect to achieve in this world. According to Aristophanes we humans can allegedly reach happiness via erotic involvement, but it seems, not just with anybody.
Eros represents this regressive possibility by allowing us to catch a glimpse of our ancient nature. Through the latter the previous oneness can be, only temporarily for sure, remembered once again.
We must permanently search for that other who matches the jagged features of our patched up bodies a. The Greeks here preferred to speak of apples e. But Aristophanes and Freud seem to have reservations. Freud, we saw, centers his critique on the loss of the beloved. Aristophanes, though aware of this danger, provides a more devastating critique by looking at the problematic functioning of erotic desire itself. The lucky lovers who are finally able to reach each other, presumably following several painful misses and rather uncomfortable fits ——— for Aristophanes makes it clear that this reunion is not what normally happens at present b ———- these lucky lovers nevertheless seem to desire something more.
Nevertheless Aristophanes challenges this silence, the same silence which Plato forces on him, by providing us with a riddle to be solved. It is he who chained Aphrodite and Ares for having committed adultery; chaining them, not to bring them eternal bliss, but rather eternal boredom. Hephaestus seems, tragically, to seek welding as punishment Od.
He must therefore not only rephrase the question, but very directly answer it in doing so. Would we not really desire just to become one once again, our belly wrinkles giving way to a stronger sphericity? Would this not be the ultimate happiness, that which involved a shared immortality? The riddle, and riddles one would think are so because they are, presumably, very difficult to answer, is to our perplexity immediately answered in the affirmative.
It seems as though nothing would be more desirable for us, ill halves, than to permanently rejoin that other whom Eros has granted us, finally, to reach. However, we should remember that even the protohumans though fused to their extremities, nonetheless did not seem to have seen themselves as part of a Paradise in which nothing was lacking.
Even asexual human sphericity finds itself lacking, striving to move beyond its original condition. Oneness reaches beyond itself, although of course it reaches out more powerfully with four arms, four legs, not just two of each. And moreover, what distinguishes our humanity lies precisely in that, like it or not, we will forever remain as halves in constant search for that which we lack. Desire flourishes precisely due to this incompleteness which moves us beyond ourselves. The feverish conditions which evolve out of the absence of the loved one seem to move in the same direction. But as I have argued this undoubtedly is not the best desirable course for us humans to take.
Our present circumstances cannot be done away with, no matter how hard we imagine ourselves to have been otherwise. Aristophanes laughs, and allows us to laugh at this all-too-human endevour. Attempting to analyze that speech in full would require taking up too many difficult issues, many of which I am uncertain. Instead, I would just like to, in order to complete this section, show how it is precisely Socrates who stands, in his daily living and acting, as the greatest challenge to the Aristophanean conception of lovers comically seeking to erase their split nature.
That Socrates is brought to court in this dialogue, though clearly in a different setting than that of the Apology, can be seen from the very start. As we pointed out above, Agathon has promised to take him to court about their wisdom with Dionysus as judge a. It is Aristophanes, silenced throughout by Plato, who carries the greatest challenge to the Socratic philosopher and his demeening view of the body. The importance of bringing this to light, is that it is particularly in the confrontation between Socrates and Alcibiades where the conflict between perspectives achieves its highest point.
See if you allow it. Philosophy, understood as the love of the truth, finds its Socratic response not only in an acceptance of the challenge, but in a demand to do so. Socrates, who as a young man was led by Diotima to the most perfect revelations a , understands this ascent as one linked directly to the search of a very different kind of truth. Although Diotima doubted whether young Socrates could follow in her lead, it is clear that now Socrates is convinced of the path he was taught by her b.
Although it is defined negatively for the most part a , and only given to us in a glimpse e , it becomes clear that according to Socrates only herein lies full human flourishing and happiness through the exploration of the divine in us:. In ascending, what was perceived as supremely important in the ascent, is relegated to lower levels of comprehension incapable of grasping the beauty of the whole. And Socrates, the embodied human being in love with philosophy, stands as palpable truth of this transformation both in word and action.
He is a human being like no other either present or past c-d. Socrates is truly a weird character. This human being ——— with unheard of courage in retreat eff , with unheard of capacity for sustained thought c , with unheard of lack of bodily necessities, not only in the most sensual of situations d , but also in the crudest of winters b ——— this human being dedicates his whole life to the undertaking of a way of life which severs ties with the richness and honors sought by the majority e. However, what I have tried to argue is instead that Plato uses the narrative character of his dialogue precisely to allow us to develop the philosophical capacity of reflexive self-awareness.
In engaging ourselves in the reading of the work as a whole, what are revealed are not straight unquestionable answers to our dilemmas and perplexities, but rather a presentation of the complexities involved in thinking about the nature of our erotic life. Plato, like Socrates and Aristophanes, loves the agon of words, over and beyond any tranquil acceptance of clear-cut positions.
The Platonic and Freudian perspectives on erotic desire touch and differ in multiple places and aspects. On the other hand, the parallel with the Platonic dialogue as a way to self-understanding is more closely bound, if one moves beyond the previous tragic perspective, to the liberating therapeutic value of the analytic situation. As I argued above, the Aristophenean position represented a simultaneous comic and tragic perspective onthe nature of our everyday love affairs.
For Freud, it seems at times, the comic aspect is completely overrun by the tragedy of our human condition. Providing us with a diagnosis of the modern condition, and not intended as a text for a particular kind of reformation CSM, 55 , it focuses rather on the characteristic repression of sexuality on which modern civilization, and for that matter any other civilization, is built.
What occurs at the level of the individual, namely, the supression of her instictual drives, is likewise the distinguishing mark of society as a whole which can survive only through an active taming of sexual and aggressive instincts. Civilization imposes sacrifices, and according to Freud, we turn to religion as an illusory compensation for our incompleteness. However, the connection of this burden to the claims to happiness is more clearly explicited in Civilization and its Discontents. The eventual decay of our body and our death, the indifference and aggressiveness of nature towards us, and the unsatisfactory character of our relations with others, are for Freud the central conditions leading to our modern malaise CiD, This malaise, built on the repression of our instinctual nature, is made possible because of our experience of guilt.
Freudian pessimism reaches its greatest height in the perception of the development of the super-ego which sets itself against the very being which gave rise to it. However, this pessimism is balanced in psychoanalysis by its claims not only to provide a regressive diagnosis of our condition, but also to provide us with the necessary tools for therapeutic counteraction. Psychoanalysis, which seeks an education to reality TFI, , aims at bringing forth the truth of our condition. Take for instance the reality of death and our unconscious denial of its presence. Towards the end of his short essay on our attitude towards death, Freud tells us that from his investigation, though undoubtedly regressive in some respects, nevertheless comes forth a realization of our human limitations.
The tolerability of this condition can be further enhanced by the possibility of of sublimation. According to Freud through the redirection of instinctual energies, repression is avoided, or at least, somehow rechanneled. However, according to Freud this capacity can be actually developed by a few, and even in those intermittently CSM, And not only this, the transformation of the sexual instinct into these higher activities, such as those of artistic activity, intellectual inquiry, ethical comprehension and religious dedication, is constantly set within the above mentioned condition of inherent supression in the coming about of any civilization.
But if this is so, how then can there truly be redirection which is not itself built upon renunciation? Psychoanalysis re-comprehends our condition by bringing to light new ways of comprehending the way we see ourselves. Psychoanalysis leads us beyond repression by paving the way into consciousness and its hidden meanings. It is this truth, which involves the painful search and articulation of a liberating narrative, the one which can also bring us closer not only to comprehending the phenomena of sublimation, but likewise to understanding the most important and immediate bonding element between both the Platonic and Freudian discourses.
Freud claimed that psychoanalysis gave us truth. Getting clearer on what he could have meant by claiming this involves looking at psychoanalytic practice itself. One is therefore concerned with specifying what will ultimately count as knowledge for this distinct situation. Ricoeur provides us with four distinguishing criteria. First, that which can be treated in the analytic situation are those experiences of the analysand which are capable of being said. The object of psychoanalysis is not instinct simply as a physiological phenomena.
Desire is accessible to us only in its coming to language. It is in virtue of this that Freud can speak of translating or deciphering the content of instinctual drives. The facts in psychoanalysis are inherently language related; instincts remain unknown in themselves. Freud makes this explicit in his paper on The Unconscious :. An instinct can never become an object of consciousness ——only the idea that represents the instinct can.
Even in the Ucs. Only what is sayable can become factual in psychoanalysis; by the same token only what the interlocutors in the Platonic dialogue say, can guide us towards a better comprehension of the text as a whole. The second criteria for facts emphasizes the fact that in the analytic situation two subjectivities encounter each other. Desire comes to language not only for the sake of being said, but more importantly, because it is a saying directed to another. Intersubjectivity is built into analytic facts because desire itself is structured intersubjectively; desire is the desire of or for another.
Without the existence of the other, desire would not be spoken. Consequently, the attempt to do away with speech by aiming at pure objectivity:. The importance of intersubjectivity finds its highest expression in the phenomena of transference. The former, coupled with the peculiar character of the analytic situation as one in which the overpowering exigencies of the reality principle are temporarily set aside, allows a repressed desire to be heard.
The recovery of this language involves a remembering which in turn is made possible by the curbing of the resistances in the analysand through new energies. It is the liberation of the latter which allow a re-interpretation of past events. Remembering is not only a crucial factor in Aristophanes myth, but likewise marks the whole of the Symposium. Here the central feature of transference comes to light. This is so for if desire is addressed to another as a demand, the other can deny this satisfaction.
This inherent quality of desire allows the analyst, through he denial of satisfaction, to aid in he reconstituiton of the analyzand herself. This intersubjective reconstitution is clearly portrayed in the agonistic interaction between, but not only, Socrates, Aristophanes and Alcibiades. A third crucial element in defining the criteria appropriate to psychoanalytic facts lies in the necessary differentiation between psychical and material reality. The meaningfulness of psychical reality reminds us that the analytic space is one in which fantasy is played out.
Likewise in the Platonic dialogue it is clear that the discussion of Eros involves many reinterpretations or events which conflict with historical reality. Nussbaum, This is to say that the primary texts are individual case histories. In this fourth criteria one can clearly see the interdependence of the previous three.
Narration is not a given but instead involves a creative process which could not even begin if desire were not accessible to us in speech. Likewise this work towards narrativity is the product of an intersubjective relation. Both analysand and the analyst are active participants in this reconstruction which requires the building up for forces to overcome resistances. In narration lies self-understanding.
I dwell in fantasy to find myself in reality. The Platonic dialogue, as act of the letrary and philosophical imagination, represents one of the most sublime of this recreations, one in which through words the world, and we ourselves, come to life once again. Having looked at what it is that Ricoeur argues counts as a fact in psychoanalysis, and having briefly compared it to some elemental aspects of the Symposium, we can turn finally to a characterization of the psychoanalytic framework as a whole. He writes in the first of two encyclopedia articles:.
Psychoanalysis as a procedure for the investigation of mental processes which are always inaccessible in any other way deals particularly with the translation and deciphering of hidden and distorted meanings. This procedure is one which claims to give us a kind of truth of therapeutic value. In order to specify these truth claims, and the criteria of verifiability appropriate to psychoanalysis, Ricoeur returns to the four criteria for facts stated above. First, analytic experience shows us desire coming to discourse.
What is true or false consequently is what is said. Therefore, the truth aimed at is one which involves a saying-true rather than a being-true. Truth is not one that is observe, but one that is heard, In saying-truly the analysand guarantees self-reflection, she moves from misunderstanding to self-recognition. Second, desire exists as desire for another. Truth claims are thus necessarily placed within the field of intersubjective communication. Pure objectivity becomes not only unthinkable, its imposition would imply the loss of speech. Both subjectivities which encounter themselves in analysis are engaged in a work which aims at the saying of truth.
The joint effort of analysand and analyst aims at giving back a fantastical yet alienated realm to the analysand. The task of the latter is to incorporate this alienation through understanding. And as we saw in our first section, it is precisely this interaction which guarantees that one does not fall into a simplistic understanding of the Symposium , one in which Plato and the Socratic speech are unproblematically identified. Here we already move beyond the second criteria for truth, namely the recognition of intersubjectivity, to the third criteria for facts of which we spoke before, that is, that what is psychoanalitically relevant is what the analysand makes of his fantasies.
The aim of analysis is not the undermining of fantasy, but rather its recovery through self-understanding. The possibility of truth herein lies in something like this. In analytic experience I come to recognize my condition as human being. That is to say, I come to realize that I may not possibly realize the whole of my fantastical life. But at the very least I come to understand the reasons for this denial. By making myself responsible for my fantasy, I acknowledge the force of necessity.
In the case of the Platonic dialogue, by realizing the tension between the Socratic and Aristophenean positions to siganl out only two I am borught to a realization of the impossibility of holding onto both simultaneously. What is developed in analysis is a case history, a history of fantasy. A misunderstood past is made truly historical in virtue not only of my playing out my fantasy, but more importantly, by being appropriated as distinct from the real. Narrativity is critical and thus aims at this specific truth, the reconstitution of a subject through self-understanding.
The analysand:. Ultimately, the truth brought to light in analysis lies in the development of this unique case history. A passionate love to which the writings of Freud lead as well. Edition Ricoeur, P. Translated by Denis Savage. In order to try to better understand the different ways in which the moral virtues are exhibited and understood, on the one hand, by the person pursuing the theoretical life, and on the other, by the one who seeks the practical life, I propose to briefly look at the specific moral virtue of courage as understood by Aristotle.
A Practical Courage and Its Complexities. The courageous, in order to truly exhibit her virtue, must know what she is doing, choose it for its own sake, and do so from a fixed and permanent disposition b Moreover, her choosing involves aiming at the mean lying between rashness and cowardice as determined rationally by the prudent man a1. City-states honour their dead; presumably then we would expect Aristotle to base the choosing of courageous actions as the means to the, more important, survival of the community by safeguarding the conditions for the common good.
But Aristotle wants instead to investigate the viability of choosing the moral life for ITS own sake, not for anything external to it only later to be considered under the banner of justice. This is the reason why for Aristotle civic courage, though the most akin to moral courage, is not quite it. The civically courageous yearns to receive something in return for what she knows involves the greatest of self-sacrifices, death. What moves her to act is truly something outside the action itself, namely the honour bestowed on those who are remembered as martyrs of the community.
According to Aristotle, having negatively characterized what courage is not , it should not be difficult to grasp what courage actually is b But, if our target is that of happiness, at the core of which lie the moral virtues in a complete life a16 , and which is pleasant in itself because virtuous actions are pleasant in themselves a14 , it looks as though courage as virtue stands quite at odds with such a goal.
Aristotle tells us that the pleasurable in courage lies in the end obtained, just as boxers who receive punches, but in the end gain glory if they win. B Contemplation and courage. Strikingly, it seems he still maintains that happiness consists in activities in accordance with virtue a9, reminding us of a16 in BK. Not only is this activity the most continuous, the most perfect and self-sufficient, one seeking no end beyond itself, but that which is most akin to the divine.
Politics and warfare courage being as central virtue to both , lack the necessary leisure b9 and are chosen for something external to themselves b Moreover, all the virtues cataloged by the morally minded, are unworthy of the gods b15 , who instead are dearest to those engaging in the contemplative life a Given all this, in the case of a courage demanding situation, how will the contemplative human act? Will he run away leaving his friends and the city which is worthy of defending? Will he not seek to preserve himself instead?